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The recent literature has incorporated labor market search and matching frictions along the lines of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) into sticky-price models and has investigated their implications for
in°ation dynamics (e.g. Walsh, 2005; Krause and Lubik, 2007; Sveen and Weinke, 2009; Trigari, 2009;
Van Zandweghe, 2010) and for optimal monetary policy (e.g. Thomas, 2008; Faia, 2009; Ravenna and
Walsh, 2010). However, there has been no research analyzing the e®ect of these labor market frictions
on the Taylor principle.1 This paper examines the implications for interest rate policy in terms of
(local) equilibrium determinacy. Several speci¯cations of the policy are studied: forecast-based or
outcome-based, strictly or °exibly in°ation targeting, or containing policy rate smoothing.
The main results of the paper are twofold. First, the forecast-based policy almost always induces
indeterminacy when it is strictly in°ation targeting and satis¯es the Taylor principle. This result is
in stark contrast to those of previous studies with a frictionless labor market (e.g. Bullard and Mitra,
2002; Woodford, 2003). Second, when the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to
that of consumption is high within ranges of parameter values calibrated in the literature, the Taylor
principle fails to ensure determinacy, regardless of whether interest rate policy is forecast-based or
outcome-based or whether it is strictly or °exibly in°ation targeting or contains policy rate smoothing.
Why does the active strictly in°ation-forecast targeting policy make determinacy almost impos-
sible? This is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market search
and matching frictions and that makes in°ation expectations self-ful¯lling. The labor market fric-
tions result in ¯rms' sluggish adjustment of employment. As a consequence, interest rate policy is
transmitted by the vacancy channel in addition to the conventional aggregate demand channel that
is the only channel in the absence of the labor market frictions. One point we emphasize here is that
these two channels have opposing e®ects on in°ation.
As usual, the aggregate demand channel leads a higher real interest rate to reduce in°ation. By
contrast, the vacancy channel causes a rise in the real interest rate to increase in°ation. This is because
1After the working-paper version of this paper (Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe, 2008), there emerged two related
papers, Tesfaselassie and Schaling (2009) and Rannenberg (2009), both of which employ Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2010)'s
sticky-price model with hiring costs. In this model, Tesfaselassie and Schaling ¯nd that the hiring costs limit the
size of the policy response to unemployment that ensures determinacy. Rannenberg introduces skill decay during
unemployment into the model and analyzes its implications for the Taylor principle.
2a real interest rate rise, by dampening consumption demand, reduces ¯rms' current vacancy posting
and hence lowers the level of employment available for production in current and subsequent periods.
Hence, the interest rate rise lowers future output supply. At the same time, such a rate rise prompts
households to substitute current with future consumption, and thus ¯rms expect consumption demand
to recover after its current decline. From this expected rise in future demand and the diminished future
supply, ¯rms anticipate a strong expansion of future vacancy posting. This raises expected future real
marginal cost via an equilibrium job creation condition, and hence expected future in°ation via the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, the vacancy channel leads a rise in the real interest rate to
increase expected future in°ation. This makes in°ation expectations self-ful¯lling under active policy
responses solely to expected future in°ation, thereby inducing indeterminacy.
The e®ect of the vacancy channel becomes stronger as the sluggishness of the adjustment of
employment relative to that of consumption increases. In such a case, output supply adjusts more
slowly to changes in consumption demand. Consequently, when that relative sluggishness is high,
determinacy is ensured only by interest rate policy that fails to meet the Taylor principle. This is
because when the real interest rate declines in response to a rise in in°ation expectations, it yields a
temporary increase in consumption demand. Hiring increases in response and the anticipation of a
decline in future consumption in the face of elevated future employment lowers expected future real
marginal cost. The resulting reduction in expected future in°ation prevents the initial in°ationary
expectations from becoming self-ful¯lling, and thus a determinate equilibrium is generated.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a sticky-price model with labor
market search and matching frictions. In this model, Section 3 examines equilibrium determinacy
under in°ation-forecast targeting policy. Section 4 provides a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 A sticky-price model with labor market search
The model is an optimizing sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions in
line with the recent studies presented before (See the Appendix for details of the model). The log-
linearized equilibrium conditions are displayed in Panel A of Table 1. Eq. (T.1) is the Euler equation
3for optimal saving decisions, (T.2) describes the marginal utility of consumption, (T.3) is the resource
constraint, (T.4) de¯nes labor market tightness as the ratio of vacancies to job searchers, (T.5) is the
law of motion of employment, (T.6) is the job creation condition that relates labor market tightness
to real marginal cost, (T.7) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and (T.8) is interest rate policy.
The ensuing analysis uses a quarterly calibration of model parameters for the U.S. economy to
illustrate conditions for determinacy. The baseline calibration is summarized in Panel B of Table 1.
As in the monetary policy literature, the discount factor is set at ¯ = 0:99, the risk aversion at ¾ = 1,
the habit persistence at h = 0:8, the substitution elasticity at ² = 10, and the probability of no price
reoptimization at ® = 0:67. Regarding the labor market parameters, the worker bargaining power of
´ = 0:5 and the search elasticity of matches of » = 0:5 are common values adopted in the labor market
search literature. The °ow value of unemployment of b = 0:7 is an intermediate value in a wide range
considered in the recent literature, as in line with Hall and Milgrom (2008). The job destruction rate
and the steady-state unemployment rate are set respectively at ½ = 0:1 and U = 1 ¡ n = 0:06, and
these two parameters determine the steady-state job ¯nding probability of p = 0:61.2 The °ow cost
of vacancy posting of ° = 0:18 is chosen to target the steady-state job ¯lling rate at q = 0:7.
3 Indeterminacy under in°ation-forecast targeting policy
In the model presented above, this section examines implications of the labor market frictions for
in°ation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. i = 1 in (T.8)) in terms of equilibrium determinacy.
First, strictly in°ation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. ÁU = Á R = 0 in (T.8)) is considered in
the absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences (i.e. h = 0), in order to facilitate
comparison with previous studies that consider a frictionless labor market. In that case, the sys-
tem of log-linearized equilibrium conditions (T.1)¡(T.8) can be reduced to a system of the form
Et[¼t+1 nt+1 nt]0 = A[¼t nt nt¡1]0, where the coe±cient matrix A is given in the Appendix. In this
system, nt¡1 is predetermined but ¼t and nt are not. Therefore, determinacy is generated if and only
if the matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the other two outside the unit
2The steady-state job ¯nding probability of 0:61 is smaller than some estimates for the U.S. economy. For instance,
Shimer (2005) reports an average quarterly job ¯nding rate of 0:83. Section 4 considers calibrations of ½ and U that
generate a larger steady-state job ¯nding rate (including p = 0:83) than their baseline calibration does.
4circle. The following proposition is thus obtained using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003).
Proposition 1 In the absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences (i.e. h = 0), strictly
in°ation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. i = 1, ÁU = Á R = 0 in (T.8)) ensures determinacy of equilibrium
if and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I: (1)¡(4) hold. Or (1), (2), and the strict inequality opposite to (3) hold.
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a2(Á ¼ ¡ 1)2 + a3(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a4 > 0 or ja5(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a6j ¡ ja7(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a8j > 0; (4)
where ·µ = ·»(°=q)[²=(² ¡ 1)]=(1 ¡ ´), and ai, i = 1;:::;8 are given in the Appendix.
Case II: (4) and the three strict inequalities opposite to (1)¡(3) hold. Or (3) and the two strict
inequalities opposite to (1) and (2) hold.
Proof See the Appendix.
Under the baseline calibration except with h = 0, (1)¡(4) are the relevant conditions for deter-
minacy and show that the strictly in°ation-forecast targeting policy guarantees determinacy for a
very narrow interval of the in°ation coe±cient, 1 < Á¼ < 1:04. The lower bound of this interval is
the Taylor principle (1), and the upper bound is given by the ¯rst inequality of (4), which severely
limits the size of the in°ation coe±cient ensuring determinacy. This is due to the vacancy channel of
monetary policy illustrated in the Introduction. This channel leads a rise in the real interest rate to
increase expected future in°ation and therefore makes in°ationary expectations self-ful¯lling under
the policy. This result is in stark contrast to Proposition 4 of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Propo-
sition 4.5 of Woodford (2003), which consider a frictionless labor market and show that the strictly
in°ation-forecast targeting policy ensures determinacy if and only if it satis¯es the Taylor principle
but its response to expected future in°ation is not too strong (e.g. 1 < Á¼ < 25 under our baseline
calibration except with h = 0).
Turning next to the baseline calibration with consumption habit persistence (i.e. h = 0:8), how
does this a®ect the incidence of indeterminacy? As noted before, the vacancy channel of monetary
5policy induces indeterminacy under the strictly in°ation-forecast targeting policy, because output
supply recovers sluggishly relative to expected future consumption demand after a tightening of the
policy. This suggests that indeterminacy might be less severe when habit persistence in consumption
preferences is taken into account, since such persistence implies that consumption demand adjusts
gradually to changes in the real interest rate so that employment could adjust despite the labor
market frictions. However, under the baseline calibration of h = 0:8, the interval of the in°ation
coe±cient ensuring determinacy is only slightly wider, 1 < Á¼ < 1:06. More generally, the upper
left panel of Fig. 1 shows that the determinacy interval widens slightly as h increases. Therefore,
consumption habit persistence is not relevant for indeterminacy under the strictly in°ation-forecast
targeting policy.
A higher job destruction rate decreases the sluggishness of employment adjustment in the law of
motion (T.5), and hence weakens the e®ect of the vacancy channel. The upper right panel of Fig. 1
shows that for the job destruction rate greater than the threshold value of ½ = 0:08, the determinacy
interval widens as ½ increases. However, when the job destruction rate is smaller than this threshold
value, only the policy that fails to meet the Taylor principle makes determinacy possible. In that
case, ¯rms adjust employment very sluggishly to changes in consumption demand, and thus the
e®ect of the vacancy channel is stronger than that of the aggregate demand channel for any policy
response to expected future in°ation. Therefore, if the real interest rate declines in response to a rise
in in°ation expectations, the resulting decrease in expected future consumption demand combined
with a persistent increase in employment lowers expected future in°ation. This prevents the initial
in°ationary expectations from becoming self-ful¯lling.
The bottom two panels of Fig. 1 investigate whether a policy that is °exibly in°ation-forecast
targeting or contains policy rate smoothing is more likely to ensure determinacy. These policies are
motivated by empirical studies such as Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), who use them as a good description
of actual monetary policy conducted in industrialized countries.3 With an active policy response to
3These studies focus on policy responses to output rather than unemployment, although Clarida et al. (2000) also
estimate policy rules with the unemployment rate. However, in our model percent changes in output are re°ected
to a large extent in percentage point changes in the unemployment rate, because labor is the only production input.
Therefore, policies that respond to output would have similar implications for determinacy as those that respond to
unemployment.
6the in°ation forecast, a su±ciently large policy response to the unemployment rate forecast or a
su±ciently high degree of policy rate smoothing ensures determinacy. With typical values from
estimated policy rules, e.g. ÁU = 0:5 and Á R = 0:8 as in line with the estimates of Clarida et al. (2000)
for the Volcker-Greenspan period, determinacy is guaranteed. This is because the feedback from the
expected future unemployment rate or the past policy rate smoothens the change in the current policy
rate in response to a shift in in°ation expectations. This dampens the resulting change in the real
interest rate and hence the change in consumption. Indeed, unemployment rises as a consequence of
a rise in the real interest rate stemming from in°ationary expectations and hence the negative policy
response to the unemployment rate subdues such a rate rise. The results in the bottom panels of Fig. 1
provide an explanation for why the U.S. economy has not shown excessive volatility in recent decades
in which Orphanides and Wieland (2008) indicate that U.S. monetary policy has been forecast-based.
From a normative perspective, the results provide an argument in favor of the policies in place of the
strictly in°ation-forecast targeting policy.
4 Sensitivity analysis
This section conducts a sensitivity analysis of equilibrium determinacy regarding values of model
parameters and the speci¯cation of interest rate policy. The results are summarized in Table 2.
4.1 Forecast-based policy
The ¯rst column with results shows how the interval of the in°ation coe±cient of strictly in°ation-
forecast targeting policy that ensures determinacy changes with values of the model parameters. The
strength of the recovery of expected future consumption in response to a rise in the real interest rate
is determined by the degree of risk aversion ¾ as well as that of habit persistence h examined above.
A lower value of the risk aversion means a higher elasticity of substitution of current with future
consumption and thereby makes indeterminacy more severe. On the other hand, the sluggishness of
employment adjustment is determined directly by the steady-state unemployment rate U as well as
the job destruction rate ½ analyzed above.4 Using (T.4) to substitute for the labor market tightness
4The steady-state job ¯nding rate in the cases of ½ = 0:15 and U = 0:02 respectively equals 0:7 and 0:83.
7µt in the employment law of motion (T.5), it can be shown that a high value of U implies that changes
in current employment persist strongly into the future. Consequently, for the value of U = 0:1, the
Taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy, since the e®ect of the vacancy channel is stronger than
that of the aggregate demand channel for any in°ation coe±cient Á¼.
The job creation condition (T.6) relates labor market tightness to real marginal cost. Using
(T.6) to substitute for the real marginal cost zt in the Phillips curve (T.7), the labor market tightness
elasticity of in°ation can be written as ·µ = ·» (°=q)[²=(²¡1)]=(1¡´). A larger value of this elasticity
ampli¯es the impact of current labor market tightness on current in°ation via the aggregate demand
channel. But it also ampli¯es the impact of expected future labor market tightness on expected future
in°ation via the vacancy channel. Then, under an in°ation-forecast targeting policy, an ampli¯ed shift
in in°ation expectations results in an ampli¯ed change in the real interest rate, which induces a strong
expected adjustment of future consumption. Consequently, a larger labor market tightness elasticity
of in°ation strengthens the e®ect of the vacancy channel relative to the demand channel.
For instance, a smaller °ow value of unemployment (b) yields a larger steady-state match value
(°=q) and hence increases the elasticity ·µ, and at the same time indeterminacy becomes more severe.5
Also, a lower value of worker bargaining power ´, although it reduces the elasticity ·µ directly,
increases the steady-state match value °=q, which on balance raises the elasticity ·µ and makes
indeterminacy more likely.6 A smaller value of the substitution elasticity ² increases the steady-state
markup ²=(² ¡ 1), but reduces the steady-state match value °=q by more, and thus the elasticity ·µ
declines and indeterminacy is mitigated.7 Moreover, a smaller probability of no price reoptimization
(®) increases the elasticity ·µ via the relation · = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)=® and leads to more severe
indeterminacy.
The search elasticity of matches, », induces indeterminacy in two ways. First, like the lower job
destruction rate ½ and the higher steady-state unemployment rate U illustrated above, a smaller value
5Likewise, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) stress that the °ow value of unemployment is an important determinant
of the productivity elasticity of labor market tightness in the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) search and matching model.
6The high values of b = 0:76 and ´ = 0:6 in Table 2 satisfy the condition that the job ¯nding probability and
the vacancy ¯lling probability lie within the unit interval, but parameter values higher than these would violate that
condition.
7The steady-state match value °=q is invariant to the °ow cost of vacancy posting, °, and hence indeterminacy is
invariant to °.
8of » increases the sluggishness of employment adjustment in the law of motion obtained by combining
(T.4) and (T.5). This leads the small value of » = 0:2 to narrow the determinacy interval of the
in°ation coe±cient Á¼. Second, a larger value of » increases the labor market tightness elasticity of
in°ation, ·µ. Consequently, the high value of » = 0:7 causes the Taylor principle to fail to ensure
determinacy.
The next column illustrates the case of °exibly in°ation-forecast targeting policy with interest
rate smoothing, i.e. i = 1, ÁU = 0:5, Á R = 0:8 in (T.8). For parameter values that require active
policy to ensure determinacy, the upper bound on the determinacy interval of the in°ation coe±cient
Á¼ increases (decreases) when these parameters weaken (strengthen) the relative e®ect of the vacancy
channel to the aggregate demand channel. However, unlike the case of strictly in°ation-forecast tar-
geting policy, this interval is always wide enough to include realistic values of the in°ation coe±cient,
e.g. Clarida et al. (2000)'s estimate of Á¼ = 2:15. When the adjustment of employment relative to
that of consumption is very sluggish, only a passive policy response to expected future in°ation guar-
antees determinacy even if the policy is °exibly in°ation-forecast targeting and contains policy rate
smoothing.
Parameter values for which the Taylor principle fails to guarantee determinacy have been used in
previous studies to calibrate their models to the U.S. economy. For instance, Merz (1995) sets the
job destruction rate at ½ = 0:07, which is within the range of values that require passive policy. The
high unemployment rate of U = 0:1 corresponds to Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2010)'s European calibration.
However, some studies with U.S. calibrations adopt even larger values, re°ecting the view that a share
of the population that is out of the labor force also searches for jobs. For instance, Andolfatto (1996)
chooses n = 0:57, implying U = 0:43, based on the average U.S. employment-population ratio. The
high search elasticity of matches of » = 0:7 and the small °ow value of unemployment of b = 0:4 are
in line with the values used by Shimer (2005).8
8Calibrations with a low job destruction rate and a high unemployment rate may feature European labor markets
well, suggesting that the Taylor principle is more likely to fail to guarantee determinacy in those economies. Likewise,
as Shimer (2005) emphasizes, the search and matching model under his calibration is not able to generate large labor
market °ows as observed in the U.S. labor market.
94.2 Outcome-based policy
The last two columns of Table 2 present the results of determinacy under outcome-based policy
(i.e. i = 0 in (T.8)). The interval of the in°ation coe±cient that ensures determinacy is always
wide enough to include its realistic values as long as the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for
determinacy. Intuitively, an active policy response to in°ation increases the real interest rate, but
such in°ation is dampened by the decline of real marginal cost that results from the rise in the real
interest rate. Consequently, the policy rate rise and hence the real interest rate rise are subdued, and
thus determinacy is guaranteed.
In the absence of consumption habit persistence, determinacy is ensured as long as the Taylor
principle is satis¯ed, i.e. Á¼ > 1, in line with Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Woodford (2003) who
consider the case of a frictionless labor market. With the habit persistence and high risk aversion,
the determinacy interval narrows, which may look inconsistent with the intuition, but there are
actually multiple determinacy intervals; e.g. under the baseline calibration, in°ation coe±cients in
the interval [6:95;27:62) induce indeterminacy whereas larger coe±cients guarantee determinacy. For
the baseline calibration of the habit persistence and the risk aversion, varying other parameter values
a®ects the upper bound on the determinacy interval in the same direction as it does under the
forecast-based policy and thus in line with the changing e®ect of the vacancy channel, although
multiple determinacy intervals exist. For parameter calibrations that induce a high sluggishness
of employment adjustment relative to that of consumption changes, a passive policy response to
in°ation ensures determinacy, regardless of whether the policy is strictly or °exibly in°ation targeting
or contains policy rate smoothing.
5 Conclusion
Labor market search and matching frictions cause sluggish adjustment of employment and hence of
output supply to changes in consumption demand. Consequently, a rise in the real interest rate
increases expected future real marginal cost and hence expected future in°ation. Therefore, inde-
terminacy is likely if interest rate policy is strictly in°ation-forecast targeting and meets the Taylor
principle. If the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption is
10high, a passive policy response to in°ation ensures determinacy, regardless of whether the policy is
forecast-based or outcome-based or whether it is strictly or °exibly in°ation targeting or contains
policy rate smoothing.
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13Table 1: Sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions.
A. System of log-linearized equilibrium conditions
¸t = Et¸t+1 + Rt ¡ Et¼t+1 (T.1)
¸t = ¡
¾
(1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ ¯h)
[ct ¡ hct¡1 ¡ ¯h(Etct+1 ¡ hct)] (T.2)
nt = (1 ¡ ½°=q)ct + ½°=qvt (T.3)
µt = vt +
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ U)
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ U)
nt¡1 (T.4)
nt = (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1 + ½(vt ¡ »µt) (T.5)
»µt =
(² ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ´)
²°=q
zt + ¯(1 ¡ ½)[(» ¡ ´p)Etµt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ´p)(Rt ¡ Et¼t+1)] (T.6)
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·zt (T.7)
Rt = Á RRt¡1 + (1 ¡ Á R)[Á¼Et¼t+i + ÁU(1 ¡ U)Etnt+i]; i = 0;1 (T.8)
B. Baseline calibration
¯ subjective discount factor 0.99
¾ relative risk aversion 1
h internal habit persistence in consumption preferences 0.8
² elasticity of substitution between retail goods 10
® probability of no price reoptimization 0.67
´ worker bargaining power 0.5
» search elasticity of matches 0.5
b °ow value of unemployment 0.7
½ job destruction rate 0.1
U steady-state unemployment rate 0.06
° °ow cost of vacancy posting 0.18
Notes: ¼t is in°ation, Rt is the nominal interest rate, zt is real marginal cost, nt is employment, vt is
vacancies, µt is labor market tightness, ct is consumption, and ¸t is the marginal utility of consumption.
· = (1¡®)(1¡®¯)=® is the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation, p is the steady-state job ¯nding
rate, and q is the steady-state vacancy ¯lling rate. The job destruction rate (½) and the steady-state
unemployment rate (U) determine p, which is 0:61 under the baseline calibration. The °ow cost of
vacancy posting (°) is chosen to set q at a target value, which is 0:7 under the baseline calibration.
14Table 2: Interval of the in°ation coe±cient Á¼ of policy ensuring determinacy.
Policy Forecast-based Outcome-based
fÁU;Á Rg f0;0g f0:5;0:8g f0;0g f0:5;0:8g
Baseline (1; 1:06) (0:99; 34:67) (1; 6:95)? (0:99; Á)
h = 0 (1; 1:04) (0:99; 11:56) (1; Á) (0:99; Á)
¾ = 0:2 (1; 1:02) (0:99; Á) (1; Á) (0:99; Á)
¾ = 5 (1; 1:12) (0:99; 15:15) (1; 2:68)? (0:99; Á)
½ = 0:07 (0; 1) (0; 0:99) (0; 1)? (0; 0:99)
½ = 0:15 (1; 1:11) (0:98; Á) (1; 8:89)? (0:98; Á)
U = 0:02 (1; 1:10) (0:99; Á) (1; 19:79)? (0:99; Á)
U = 0:1 (0; 1) (0; 0:99) (0; 1)? (0; 0:99)?
b = 0:4 (0; 1) (0; 1) (0; 1)? (0; 1)
b = 0:76 (1; 1:13) (0:98; Á) (1; 10:72)? (0:98; Á)
´ = 0:1 (0; 1) (0; 0:99) (0; 1)? (0; 0:99)
´ = 0:6 (1; 1:06) (0:99; Á) (1; 8:65)? (0:99; Á)
² = 7 (1; 1:10) (0:99; Á) (1; 9:07)? (0:99; Á)
® = 0:5 (1; 1:02) (1; 15:96) (1; 3:98)? (1; Á)
® = 0:8 (1; 1:20) (0:96; Á) (1; 15:16)? (0:96; Á)
» = 0:2 (1; 1:04) (0:98; 15:29) (1; 2:36) (0:98; Á)
» = 0:7 (0; 1) (0; 0:99) (0; 1)? (0; 0:99)
Notes: Á denotes the maximum value of Á¼ considered in this paper and it is set to 40. A star (?)
indicates that there is at least one other disjoint interval of more aggressive policy responses ensuring
determinacy.
15Figure 1: Regions of forecast-based policy responses ensuring determinacy.


































Notes: Each panel uses the baseline calibration with ÁU = Á R = 0, except for the parameter of the
vertical axis. White, gray, and black areas indicate respectively regions of determinate, indeterminate,
and explosive equilibrium.
16A Appendix
This appendix presents details of our sticky-price model with labor market search and matching
frictions. It also contains the proof of Proposition 1, which provides necessary and su±cient conditions
for determinacy of equilibrium when interest rate policy is strictly in°ation-forecast targeting in the
absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences.
A.1 A sticky-price model with labor market search
The model is an optimizing sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions. This
model is in line with recent business cycle studies, such as Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007),
Sveen and Weinke (2009), Trigari (2009), and Van Zandweghe (2010), and recent monetary policy
studies, such as Thomas (2008), Faia (2009), and Ravenna and Walsh (2010).
The economy is inhabited by four types of agents. First, the representative household consists of
a continuum of members. Some members are employed and others search for jobs, but all members
provide each other with insurance against unemployment risk by making joint consumption and saving
decisions. Second, the representative wholesale ¯rm hires workers in the matching market, and uses a
linear technology to produce homogeneous goods. Third, retail ¯rms transform wholesale goods into
di®erentiated goods and set prices on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983). Finally, the monetary
authority sets its policy rate according to a Taylor (1993) style rule. A sunspot shock to in°ation
expectations is assumed to be the only source of aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
A.1.1 Labor market
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). Unemployed workers search for jobs, and ¯rms pay a °ow cost Pt° to maintain a
job opening in period t. At the beginning of the period, a proportion ½ 2 (0;1) of existing matches
nt¡1 is exogenously destroyed before matching starts. Newly matched workers mt become productive
instantaneously, and thus the law of motion of employment is
nt = (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1 + mt: (A.1)
17The matching friction faced by workers and ¯rms is represented by a constant returns to scale matching






where Ã > 0, » 2 (0;1), vt denotes the number of vacancies, and ut is the number of searching workers.
With the labor force normalized to one, the latter is given by
ut = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1; (A.3)
while the unemployment rate is de¯ned as
Ut = 1 ¡ nt: (A.4)


















measures the labor market tightness. Thus, when the labor market is tight, a worker is more likely
to ¯nd a job, and a ¯rm is less likely to ¯ll a vacancy.
A.1.2 Representative household
The representative household consists of a continuum of household members. To avoid distributional
issues, it is assumed as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) that employed and unemployed house-
hold members pool consumption. Thus, the presence of a representative household can be considered.
This household purchases consumption goods ct, supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and holds
nominal one-period bonds Bt that earn the gross nominal interest rate Rt in the subsequent period.







18subject to the budget constraint
Ptct + Bt = Pt[wt nt + b(1 ¡ nt)] + Dt + Bt¡1Rt¡1:
Here, ¯ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, ¾ > 0 measures relative risk aversion, and h is
the degree of (internal) habit persistence in consumption preferences. Family income consists of
wage income Pt wt nt from employment, unemployment income Pt b(1 ¡ nt), and other income Dt.
The disutility from employment is normalized to zero. Consumption ct = [
R 1
0 ct(j)(²¡1)=²dj]²=(²¡1) is
a composite of di®erentiated goods produced by retail ¯rms, with the substitution elasticity ² > 1.
Thus, cost-minimizing demand for good j is given by ct(j) = (Pt(j)=Pt)










The optimality conditions for consumption and bond holdings are given by
¸t = (ct ¡ hct¡1)
¡¾ ¡ ¯hEt(ct+1 ¡ hct)
¡¾; (A.9)




where ¸t is the marginal utility of consumption and ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross in°ation rate. Taking
account of the labor market °ows gives rise to the following asset value of employment
Wt = wt ¡ b + ¯Et
¸t+1
¸t
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ pt+1)Wt+1: (A.11)
The household's marginal value of a family member matched with a job equals the sum of the premium
of the real wage over the unemployment bene¯t and the discounted expected future value. The latter
is discounted by the time-varying discount factor that values future consumption in present terms
and by the probability that the job is destroyed and no new job is found.
A.1.3 Representative wholesale ¯rm
The representative wholesale ¯rm uses a production technology that is linear in labor, yt = nt. This
¯rm chooses employment nt and vacancies vt so as to maximize pro¯ts by selling its product at a







[(zt ¡ wt)nt ¡ °vt]
19subject to (A.1) and (A.6). The conditions for pro¯t maximization include







where the Lagrange multiplier on the employment law of motion (A.1), Jt, denotes the ¯rm's asset
value of a ¯lled job, which consists of the current return plus the discounted expected future value.
Pro¯t maximization requires this value to be equal to the average cost of ¯lling a job opening. The
average cost is the °ow cost of posting a vacancy times the number of vacancies posted in order to
¯ll one job, which is the inverse of the vacancy ¯lling probability.
The costly job creation gives rise to a surplus from a match, St = Jt + Wt, which is split between
the matched worker and ¯rm through Nash bargaining. The real wage is therefore set in order to
provide the worker and the ¯rm with a share of the match surplus Wt = ´St and Jt = (1 ¡ ´)St,











+ (1 ¡ ´)b: (A.14)
A job entails compensation for a fraction ´ of the revenue and the expected saving of hiring costs that
the match generates, in addition to a fraction 1 ¡ ´ of the forgone unemployment income.
A.1.4 Retail ¯rms
There is a continuum of retail ¯rms j 2 [0;1], each of which produces one unit of di®erentiated good j
from one unit of wholesale goods and sells a quantity Yt(j) of good j to households in a monopolistically
competitive market. Cost minimization implies that each retail ¯rm's real marginal cost is equal to
the wholesale goods' real price zt. Then, facing households' demand Yt(j) = ct(j) = (Pt(j)=Pt)
¡² ct,
each retail ¯rm chooses its pro¯t-maximizing price subject to Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) style price
stickiness. That is, each period a fraction ® 2 [0;1) of retail ¯rms does not reoptimize price and








































If prices are perfectly °exible (i.e. ® = 0), (A.15) reduces to Pt(j) = [²=(²¡1)]Ptzt, which shows that
1=z = ²=(² ¡ 1) is the steady-state markup of each retail ¯rm's price over its marginal cost. In the
presence of price stickiness, the ¯rm's actual markup di®ers from, but tends toward, the steady-state
markup.
A.1.5 Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts in°ation targeting policy that adjusts the policy rate in response














; i = 0;1; (A.16)
where R is the steady-state nominal interest rate, Á R 2 [0;1) is the degree of policy rate smoothing,
and Á¼, ÁU are non-negative policy coe±cients on in°ation and unemployment rates. These policy
speci¯cations are referred to as, respectively, outcome-based if i = 0 and forecast-based if i = 1.
A.1.6 Log-linear approximation and calibration
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of processes for all the endogenous variables satis-
fying (A.1)¡(A.16), the aggregate resource constraint yt = Yt+°vt, and the market clearing condition




measures relative price dispersion across retail goods. Log-linearizing these equilibrium conditions
around the steady state and rearranging the resulting equations yields Eqs. (T.1)¡(T.8), where
· ´ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)=® > 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation, and the hat on a variable
denotes its percentage deviation from the steady-state value. These equations are given in Panel A
of Table 1 in the paper. In this system the unemployment rate and the number of searching workers
21have been substituted by
Ut = U ¡ (1 ¡ U)^ nt;
^ ut = ¡
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ U)
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ U)
^ nt¡1:
Panel B of Table 1 in the paper contains the baseline calibration of model parameters and the steady-
state unemployment rate. The steady-state job ¯nding rate p = m=u is obtained from the steady-
state conditions of (A.1) and (A.4), which determine the steady-state number of new matches and
job searchers as
m = ½(1 ¡ U);
u = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ U):
The steady-state vacancy ¯lling rate q is obtained from the steady-state conditions of (A.12) and
(A.14) as
q = °
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)
(1 ¡ ´)(z ¡ b)
:
A.2 Indeterminacy under in°ation-forecast targeting policy
This section studies determinacy conditions when interest rate policy is strictly in°ation-forecast
targeting (i.e. i = 1, ÁU = Á R = 0 in (T.8)) in the absence of habit persistence in consumption
preferences (i.e. h = 0). The system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions (T.1)¡(T.8) can then be
reduced to a system of the form
Et[^ ¼t+1 ^ nt+1 ^ nt]
0 = A[^ ¼t ^ nt ^ nt¡1]
0; (A.17)


















¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)
µ
































½(1 ¡ ») + U[1 ¡ ½(1 ¡ »)]








®3 =·(1 ¡ ½)[½(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ´p) ¡ ®1(» ¡ ´p)]:
In this system, ^ nt¡1 is predetermined but ^ ¼t and ^ nt are not. Therefore, determinacy of equilibrium is
generated if and only if the coe±cient matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and
the other two outside the unit circle.9 We thus obtain the following proposition using Proposition C.2
of Woodford (2003).
Proposition 2 In the absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences (i.e. h = 0), strictly
in°ation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. i = 1, ÁU = Á R = 0 in (T.8)) ensures determinacy of equilibrium
if and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I: (A.19)¡(A.22) hold. Or (A.19), (A.20), and the strict inequality opposite to (A.21) hold.






[½ + 2U(1 ¡ ½)][» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)
o








(» ¡ ´p) ¡ ¾½
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a2(Á ¼ ¡ 1)2 + a3(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a4 > 0 or ja5(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a6j ¡ ja7(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a8j > 0; (A.22)
where ·µ =
·»²°=q
(²¡1)(1¡´), a1 = ¾½
n³




[U + ½(1 ¡ U)] ¡
°
q(1 ¡ ½)[U + ½(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ U)]
o
, and
ai, i = 2;:::;8, are given in the Proof.
Case II: (A.22) and the three strict inequalities opposite to (A.19)¡(A.21) hold. Or (A.21) and
the two strict inequalities opposite to (A.19) and (A.20) hold.
Proof For the system's coe±cient matrix A, it can be shown that its three eigenvalues are the
solutions to the cubic equation
¹
3 + b1¹
2 + b2¹ + b3 = 0;
9To be precise, this condition is su±cient for determinacy but only generically necessary. Throughout the paper,
consideration of non-generic boundary cases is omitted.
23where b1 = ®2 ¡1¡A11=B ¡®1(A12=B)(Á¼ ¡1), b2 = A11=B ¡®2(1+A11=B)¡®1(A13=B)(Á¼ ¡1),
and b3 = ®2A11=B. Because determinacy of equilibrium obtains if and only if the coe±cient matrix
A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the other two outside the unit circle, it follows
that the necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy is that exactly one solution to the cubic
equation is inside the unit circle and the other two are outside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of
Woodford (2003), this is the case if and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
(Case 1) 1 + b1 + b2 + b3 < 0; ¡1 + b1 ¡ b2 + b3 > 0:
(Case 2) 1 + b1 + b2 + b3 > 0; ¡1 + b1 ¡ b2 + b3 < 0; b3(b3 ¡ b1) + b2 ¡ 1 > 0 or jb1j > 3:
The condition b3(b3 ¡ b1) + b2 ¡ 1 > 0 can be written as a2(Á ¼ ¡ 1)2 + a3(Á ¼ ¡ 1) + a4 > 0, where
a2 = ¡®3 [(1 + ®2)®3 + ®1A13], a3 = [(1 + ®2)(1 ¡ 2¯ ¡ ®2)®3 + ®1 (®2A12 ¡ ¯A13)]A11, and a4 =
(1+®2)(®2+¯)(1¡¯)A2
11. The condition jb1j > 3 can be written as ja5(Á ¼¡1)+a6j¡ja7(Á ¼¡1)+a8j > 0,
where a5 = ¡[(1 ¡ ®2)®3 + ®1A12], a6 = ¡[(1 ¡ ®2)¯ + 1]A11, a7 = 3®3, and a8 = 3¯A11.
We ¯rst consider the case of B(1 ¡ » ¡ °=q) > 0, which can be reduced to (A.21). Then, the ¯rst
two inequalities in (Case 2) can be reduced to (A.19) and (A.20), respectively. Hence, the determinacy
condition is either of the following two.
(Case 1.A) (A.21) and the two strict inequalities opposite to (A.19) and (A.20) hold.
(Case 2.A) (A.19)¡(A.22) hold.
We turn next to the case of B(1 ¡ » ¡ °=q) < 0. In this case, the determinacy condition is either
of the following two.
(Case 1.B) (A.19), (A.20), and the strict inequality opposite to (A.21) hold.
(Case 2.B) (A.22) and the three strict inequalities opposite to (A.19)¡(A.21) hold.
Therefore, in Proposition 2, Case I consists of (Case 2.A) and (Case 1.B), and Case II consists of
(Case 2.B) and (Case 1.A).
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